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PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMY*
Duncan MacRae
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
INTRODUCTION
In the theory of equilibrium growth investment is treated in a passive
- 1 /
manner. Firms in the aggregate are 'assumed to invest at a rate which will
absorb full employment saving. Since planned saving is equal to planned
investment In equilibrium, investment is determined by a saving function.
Although firms actively produce, they passively invest. They are assumed
to produce so as to maximize profits but to invest only so as to maintain
2
full employment equilibrium. But firms do not invest passively, no more
so than they produce passively. They both produce and invest so as to
maximize the net present value of the firm. The purpose of this paper is
to derive some of the implications of this assumption for equilibrium
growth.
This research was supported in part by funds from the General Motors
Corporation under the General Motors Grant for Highway Transportation
Research. I am indebted to E. S. Chase, R. Dorfman, and R. M. Solow
for many helpful comments.
See F. H. Hahn and R. C. 0. Matthews, "The Theory of Economic Growth: A
Survey," Economic Journal
,
vol. 74 (1964), p. 741.
2
In F. H. Hahn, "Equilibrium Dynamics with Heterogeneous Capital Goods,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol. 80 (1966), pp. 633-46, investment is
allocated over the varieties of capital goods so as to maximize profits
under short-run perfect foresight. The level of investment, however, is
determined solely by an '.'extreme classical savings function."

THE FIRM
3
Let us begin by examining the theory of the firm in the context of the two-
4 5
sector canonical model of capital using continuous-time optimal control theory
as a tool of analysis. Imagine a representative firm in an equilibrium economy.
The firm produces consumption goods (homogeneous or composite) and homogeneous
Investment goods with the aid of labor and homogeneous fixed capital. The
activities of the firm are production of consumption goods, Y
,
production of
Investment goods, Y , allocation of labor to production, L, allocation of capital
to production, K, hiring labor, L, renting capital, K
,
and gross investment, I.
Renting out is negative renting; and disinvestment is negative investment. The
production of consumption goods Is related to the allocation of labor and capital
to production and production of Investment goods by a iJroduction-possibility
frontier:
Yj, - F(L,K,Yj)
,
(1)
where F.ls concave and homogeneous of degree one. Capital allocated to pro-
duction cannot exceed the available capital, or:
3
The model of the firm presented in this paper has evolved from the work of Arrow
and Jorgenson. See K. J. Arrow, "Optimal Capital Policy, the Cost of Capital,
and Myopic Decision Rules," Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics .
Vol. 15 (Tokyo, 1964), and D. W. Jorgenson, "The Theory of Investment Behavior,
in R. Ferber, (ed.). Determinants of Investment Behavior . (New York: Columbia
University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1967).
4
P. A. Samuelson, "Indeterminacy of Development in a Heterogeneous Capital Model
with Constant Saving Propensity," In K. Shell, ed.. Essays on the Theory of
Optimal Economic Growth . (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967).
L. S. Pontryagin, et^ al. The Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes . (New
York: Intersclence, 1962).
An equilibrium economy Is one in which all price and rate of Interest expectations
are justified and all labor, consumption, production, and investment plans are
realized. Moreover, this is an economy with perfect competition, diminishing
returns to labor and capital, no economies of mass production, no external
economies or diseconomies, and no technological disturbances.

K 5 K + Kj^, (2)
where K is the stock of capital owned by the firm. Similarly, labor allocated
to production cannot exceed the labor hired, or;
L 5 L. (3)
Furthermore, Y , Y , L, K, L - 0, and K is not sign restricted. Assume thatCI R
capital depreciates by evaporation at a constant rate y, so that the change in
the stock of capital owned by the firm is given by:
K -= I - liK, (4)
where K is continuous, K ^ 0, and I is not sign restricted. Once the initial
stock of capital owned by the firm, K^^, is given, the behavior of the firm over
time is completely determined by the time paths of the activity levels Y^, Y_, L,
K, L, K^, and I subject to (1) - (A).
The firm hires labor, rents capital, allocates the labor and available
capital, and invests so as to maximize the net present value of the firm:
J = 0^c\ + ^^I - WL - RK^ - Pjl]e-P^dt. (5)
/5r(T)dT
where p = *
P is the price of consumption goods, P^ is the price of investment goods, W is
the wage rate, R is the gross rate of rental, r is the rate of interest, and all
prices are assumed to be positive. In an equilibrium the firm takes all prices
The firm is valued according to the discounted cash flow approach. See M. H.
Miller and F. Modlglianl, "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares," Journal of Business
,
Vol. 34 (1961), pp. 411-33, for a discussion
of the equivalence of this approach to other approaches to the valuation of
the firm assuming perfect capital markets, rational behavior, and perfect
certainty.

and the rate of interest as given. The firm has expectations about prices and
the rate of interest over time for an infinite horizon. In an equilibrium
8 '
economy these expectations are justified. The problem of the firm, therefore.
Is to choose the activity levels so as to maximize J subject to (1) - (4)
.
The first condition for the maximization of the net present value of the
firm is that the firm produce so as to maximize profits i.e. choose the production
activity levels, Y^, Y^, L, K, L, and IC, so as to maximize
H = P^Y^, + PjYj - WL - RK^ - P^yK (6)
9
subject to (1) - (3) given K.
The second condition is that the firm invest so that the imputed value of
/
capital owned by the firm is equal to the market cost, and the Imputed value of
i
capital not owned by the firm is not greater than the market cost.
The third condition is that the firm invest so that the present value of
the stock of capital owned by the firm eventually vanishes.
That the three conditions are necessary follows from an application of the
maximum principle. For consider the following Hamiltonian system:
^ = [Pj,Y^ + PjYj - WL - RK^ - Pj.I]e"P'' + Yj[I - nK] - YjrH " VK] , (7)
K » 1^, (8)
i „ Z9^_ Q e~P*^ (9)
8 '
This is a continuous-time linear optimal control problem with state-control
constraints and a variable end point where the functional is given by an
Improper integral.
9
Note that depreciation is a fixed cost in the short-run and, hence, can be
ignored in the choice of activity levels.
L. S. Pontryagin, op.cit.
,
p. 267.

subject to the transversality condition,
and (1) - (3), where
lira V K = 0, (10)
Y„ » when K > 0, (11)
K- is given, and Q is the imputed gross rate of rental. The maximum principleR
states that the production and investment activity levels which maximize J
subject to (1) - (4) also maximize^?' subject to (1) - (3) given K and ¥_,
where K and Yj. satisfy (8) - (11), and.
Yir - and Y^ ^ when K •= 0. (12)
Since the investment activity level chosen by the firm maximizes^.
Therefore, from (13) and (7), He «s^; and the production activity levels which
maximize J also maximize H given K. From (9), (13), and the maximization of H,
we obtain
p ; eP*^
r - p^ - y + / + -|—
.
(14)
R ^I
Therefore, either P = Qt. so that r = := y + — , when K > 0, (15)II
• •
R ^I
or P ^ Q,, so that r > ^^ y + p-, when K = 0. (16)
/I I
where Q_ = ^^e. is the Imputed value of capital. The firm is indifferent
I I
-
between investment and disinvestment if P_ " Q_ and holds no capital if P_ > Q-.
From (12) we see that once P^j. = Q-r . then P_ = Q^j. forever after. Finally, from the
transversality condition (10) we obtain the other constraint on investment:
I
lim Pj.Ke'P'^ -=0. (17)
If K j5 as t-K», then (10) and (17) imply that
lim Q^e"^^ = lim P e'^^ » 0. (18)
t"**" t-**»
Differentiating P_e logarithmically we see from (15) that (18) means the own
rate of interest must eventually be positive. Multiplying (15) through by
P^e ^^^' , Integrating from t to ", and using (18) we see that the present
imputed value of capital owned by the firm, which is equal to the present value
of the market cost, is equal to the integral of the present value of the rate of
rental on capital, or:
Q^e-P*^ = Pje-P*^ = e^'^ /^Re-^^^^^'^dT, (19)
which means that if once P «= Q «= 0, then P = Q_ = forever after.
The three conditions for the maximization of the net present value of the
firm are not only necessary but also sufficient in an equilibrium economy.
Profit maximization under constant returns to scale implies
H = RK - P yK. (20)
From (6) and (20) we can write (5) as
J = /^[RK - Pj.I]e"P*'dt. (21)
Integrating (21) by parts while using (4), (15), and (16) we obtain
J •= lim /J[RK - P I]e"^*^dt
» P (O)K(O) - lim P (T)K(T)e"^'^.
(22)
From (17) and (22) we see that the net present value is maximized and is equal

to the Initial value of the stock of capital owned by the fiirm, or:
/~[RK - Pjl]e~^*^dt = P(0)K(0). (23)
Production is a short-run problem of profit maximization which can be
divorced from the problem of investment. Since H is a concave function of the
production activity levels, and the resource constraints, (1) - (3), form a
convex set, the short-run problem of the firm is a concave programming problem.
Either the firm produces no output and rents out all the capital it owns, or it
is indifferent between producing and renting more or less. This is the usual
result of indeterminacy of output by the firm with constant returns to scale
12
and perfect competition. The size of the firm as measured by H, however, is
/
well determined by (20) to be equal to net rent on capital owned by the firm,
or pfofit.
Investment, and, hence, the stock of capital owned by the firm are, in
general, Indeterminate with the exception that the present value of the stock of
capital owned by the firm must eventually vanish. This exception prevents the
firm from over-accumulating capital. Differentiating P Ke logarithmically
we see from (15) that (17) means the proportionate rate of growth of the stock
of capital owned by the firm must eventually be less than the own rate of
The firm hires labor, rents capital, and allocates the labor and available
capital between the various activities so that the marginal net revenue of
each activity used is equal to its marginal imputed cost and the marginal net
revenue of each activity not used is not greater than its marginal Imputed
cost. Sfee R. Dorfman, P. A. Samuelson, and R. Solow, Linear Programming
and Economic Analysis . (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958).
12
See P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis . (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1947). In general, the firm will be completely
specialized in the production of either consumption goods or investment goods;
and the choice of technique in production is well determined by the market
prices given the technology of the firm.
13
The optimal capital policy of the firm, therefore, is not perfectly myopic as
is the policy described in K. J. Arrow, op.clt.

interest. This means, in particular, that the firm will not invest forever all
of the earnings on capital, because it can alwavs do better by less investment,
unless it begins with no initial stock of capital. The size of the firm as
measured by J is v;ell determined, however, by (21) to be equal to the value
of the initial stock of capital owned by the firm.
If we allow for discontinuous changes in K, the analysis of production and
investment by the firm is essentially unaltered. The behavior of the firm for
an infinite horizon continues to be treated as the limiting behavior of the firm
for a finite horizon, T, as the horizon increases without limit, where the firm
ceases to exist at T. Since production is independent of investment, the net
present value of the firm is given by
J - 11m /otRK - P_I]e""P*^dt - E P_(t.) [K+Ct,") - K~(t,)]e"P^ (24)
where K = I - pK t ?« t
,
(25)
K'*'(t ) = lim K(t), K~(t ) = lim K(t)
,
(26)
t-^t^ f>t^
t>t t<t
t. are the jump points to be determined, ^ t £ T, t^ is the set of Integers,
and K ^ O.-"-*
lA
See M. H. Miller and F. Modigliani, op. cit.
,
p. 421 for a similar result in the
case of constant growth rates.
See J. Williamson, "Profit, Grov7th and Sales Maximization," Economica
,
Vol. 33 (1966), pp. 1-16 for a discussion of the "optimum size" of the firm.
16
Note that no value is attached to K (T) since T is the horizon and not the
planning period of the firm.

It is shown In an appendix that (17) becomes
Moreover, if
lltn Pj(T)K+(T)e"^^ = 0. (27)
r(t) > fffi - V H-
Hi} (28)
for any t such that < t - T, K~(t) must be zero, and if
r(t) = ^^ - u + ^^ (29)^^^^ P(t) ^ P(t) ^^^^
for any t such that :$ t ^ T, all K~(t) such that K~(t) ^ are optimal, and once
(29) is true it is true forever and the firm is indifferent between continuous and
discontinuous changes in K. Therefore, K need not change discontinuously to
maximize net present value except when (28) is true for t 0. Then the firm
disinvests the entire initial stock of capital owned by the firm so that (16)
applies and
J » Pj(0)Kq.^^ (30)
Although the maximum principle cannot be applied directly to a control problem
with jumps in the state variable, it can be applied to an ingenious re-
formulation of the control problem developed by Rishel and Vind. See R. W.
Rishel, "An Extended Pontryagin Principle for Control Systems whose Laws
Contain Measures," SIAM Journal on Control , Vol. 3 (1965), pp. 191-205, and
K. Vind, "Control Systems with Jumps in the State Variables," Econometrica
,
forthcoming.
18
Discontinuous changes in production and investment processes have been
examined in R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming . (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957), p. 207-21, and M. Nerlove and K. J. Arrow, "Optimal
Advertising Policy Under Dynamic Conditions," Economica, N. S. Vol. 29 (1962),
pp. 129-142 with similar results.
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Note that price and rate of interest behavior such that
Is incompatible with equilibrium. If (31) were true, the firm would immediately
attempt to invest an arbitrarily large amount to obtain an arbitrarily large net
present value, which is incompatible with both perfect competition and net
present value maximization. If there were an upper bound on investment, however,
the problem of the existence of an optimum would not become evident until the
terminal horizon. If (31) were true for t = T, the firm would invest the maximum
amount until T, when" it would disinvest the entire stock of capital owned by the
19
firm. But this is not a meaningful policy for an infinite horizon.
19
See J. Tindbergen, "Optimum Savings and Utility Maximization over Time,"
Econometrica , Vol. 28 (1960), pp. 481-9, for a similar analysis of investment
In an economy where the rate of discount on consumption is less than the rate
of return on saving. >
.

t11
THE ECONOMY
We have examined the production and investment behavior of the representative
firm under the assumption of net present value maximization. We have seen that
the essential difference between this assumption and the assumption of profit
maximization is that the proportionate rate of growth of the stock of capital
owned by the firm must eventually be less than the own rate of interest. Now
let us derive the implications of this constraint on investment for equilibrium
20
growth in the two-sector canonical model of capital assuming households do all
the saving and firms do all the Investing.
Since all capital in the economy is owned by some firm, the market cost of
capital is equal to the Imputed value and (29) is true for all t. Then invest-
ment by firm^ is Indeterminate. Once a saving function (e.g. a proportional
saving function) Is Introduced, however, aggregate investment is completely
determined.
Therefore, if the number of firms is finite, the constraint on investment
behavior of the representative firm imposed by the assumption of net present
value maximization becomes a constraint on the equilibrium saving behavior of the
economy. Firms in the aggregate invest at a rate which will absorb full employ-
ment saving. Any saving function such that the proportionate rate of growth of
the stock of capital is not eventually less than the own rate of interest,
however. Is Incompatible with equilibrium. This means that saving must eventually
be less than' earnings on capital.
21
Thus, the dynamically inefficient paths of consumption described by Phelps,
along which the proportionate rate of growth is eventually greater than the own
20
P. A, Samuelson, op.cit. ,pp. 220-1.
21
E. S. Phelps, Golden Rules of Economic Growth . (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,
1966).
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rate of interest, cannot occur. Moreover, paths of consumption where the rate
of growth is eventually equal to the rate of interest, corresponding to the
Golden Rule path, are Inconsistent with equilibrium. Although these paths are
dynamically efficient paths of consumption, they are not optimal from the point
of view of the firm.
The incompatibility of Golden Rule equilibrium and net present value
maximization would seem to conflict with Debreu's result that a Pareto optimum
22
is a valuation equilibrium. Radner has shown, however, that the linear function
approach to present value maximization with an infinite horizon, adopted by
Debreu, is not necessarily equivalent to the "scalar product" approach, which
23
is used in this paper. The cases in which the two approaches give different
results are "boundary cases," corresponding to Golden Rule paths.
Another way to see the nature of this Incompatibility is to consider the
problem of optimal saving behavior in a centrally planned economy described by
2A
Koopmans. He shows that if the rate of discount on consumption per capita is
zero, a necessary condition for eligibility of a path is that it eventually
approaches the Golden Rule path. The problem of optimal saving behavior with a
zero discount rate, therefore, is transformed into a utility maximization problem
with a fixed end point equal to the Golden Rule stock of capital. If a central
planner with a zeto discount rate imposes this fixed end point on the firms,
instead of allowiAg them a variable end point, these paths are compatible with
equilibrium'.
G. Debreu, "Val'iiation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum," Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci.
of the U.S.A.
, Vol. 40 (195A)
,
pp. 588-92.
23
R. Radner, "Efficiency Prices for Infinite Horizon Production Programmes,"
Review of Economic Studies
,
Vol. 34 (1967), pp. 51-66.
24
See T. C. Koopmans , "On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth," in EconoTnetric
Approach to Development Planning . (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1965), pp. 225-87,
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If the number of firms is infinite, the constraint on investment by the
representative firm is not necessarily a constraint on the investment behavior
of the economy. If growth in the stock of capital is accompanied by growth
25
in the number of firms or never ending buck-passing, both the dynamically
inefficient paths of consumption and the Golden Rule path may be compatible
with equilibrium.
CONCLUSIONS
One Implication of net present value maximization for equilibrium growth in
the two-sector canonical model of capital is that the dynamically inefficient
paths of coiisumptlon are incompatible with equilibrium if a finite number of
firms do all investing. A second implication is that the dynamically efficient
paths approaching the Golden Rule path are also incompatible with equilibrium.
This result depends upon the approach taken to present value maximization with
an infinite horizon. A problem of decentralizing allocation over time may arise,
therefore, not only with an infinite number of firms but also with an infinite
horizon.
25
See T. C. Koopmans, Three Essays on the State of Economic Science . (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 112. Another paradox of Infinity referred to by
Samuelso'n as tUe tulip mania phenomenon in "Intertemporal Price Equilibrium,"
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. Vol. 79 (1957), pp. 181-219, could occur if a
market vklue is attached to K+(T) and T is allowed to increase without limit.
But this would imply T is the planning period of the firm, and not the
terminal horizon.

APPENDIX
2fi
Following Vlnd the problem of the firm with jumps in K can be reformulated
as an optimal control problem without discontinuous changes in the state
variable by introducing an additional concept of time. Let t be real time and
T be analytic time. Then the problem is to choose u^, I, and v over analytic
time so as to maximize
J.» lim /3»Uo[R(t)K-PT(t)I]e"P^*'^''^ + [l-u„]P^(t)ve"P*^dT (A-1)
1^ To I 1
^"''^^^' '^^ f " UqCI-vK] + [1-Uq]v. (A-2)
K ^ 0, I and V not sign restricted, ^ Uq ^ 1, tCx-) » 0, t(T,) = T, and K(Tq)
" Kq, where T-. is given and T. is free,
tT •= t, + Z Vn(t,) and T."'' = t. + E vAt.). (A-4)i 1 j<i J i i j<^ j
The optimal Hamiltonian system is given by:
max n » Uq * + (1-Uq) [4'j.-Pj.(t)e~^^'^^ ''^Jv = 0. (A-5)
Uq.I.v
(A-6)
and -— «• -
dT
u '^ -
8Yj.
dT 9K'
iy(t)
(I-Uq) [r(t) -
p^^^j
^^K. Vind, ibid.
1 Pje-P^'^)*^, (A-7)
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where Jl " [R(t)K - Vj_(t)lW^^^^ '^ + Yj.[I-vK] - Yj^ H-PK] (A-8)
with Yv " if K > 0. an<i * " 'i'^ + ^:J^
If u- " 1, the results of pp. A-8 follow Immediately. If u^. " 0, real
time stops at t
.
, and the present imputed value of capital owned by the firm
remains constant, i.e.
§J « and -jzr=-'' 0. (A-9)
Then $ 5 and
max fi " [Yj. - Pj(tj^)e"^^^i^'^i]v •= 0. (A-10)
Uq.I.v
If there is to be a jump in K, the imputed value of capital must be equal to the
market value of capital, i.e. if v ?* 0,
I X I i
If (29) is true, -j— " 0. Then we must have $(t) = 0, otherwise u. =0
forever and real time never starts again. But if (29) is true, and $ = 0, the
firm is indifferent between continuous and discontinuous changes in K.
If (28) is true, sign ^ >= - sign ^. Either * = 0, < u^ ^ 1, 4§ = 0.
uT QT U QT
d<t dK d*
^ = 0, and K = or * < 0, u- «= 0, §^ < 0, ^^ > 0, until K = 0. Hence, thedT ' ' dT dT
only jump that is required is when K_ > and (28) is true for t = 0. Then
— +
Tq «= and real time starts again at T «= + v (0), where v (0) is finite.
The transversallty condition is now given by (27).



